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1. Introduction
Sources of wage differentials include sex, education, and occupation. In 
particular, it is well known that wages in large firms are generally higher 
than in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Companies that are 
popular among new graduates are often large, not only because of their 
notoriety or financial soundness, but also because of their high wages.
One of the reasons why wage differentials attract people’s attention is 
that they are an ethical concern. If they come from differences in workers’ 
abilities, there is no problem, but if they come from some kind of market 
inefficiency, they lower economic welfare. Suppose that, other things being 
equal, there are wage differentials among ethnicities. In this case, firms 
《Abstract》
Using measures of financial constraints on firms, we investigate whether 
financial constraints explain the firm size–wage effect. The results suggest 
that financial constraints reduce the effect of firm size on wages, but that 
the effect remains statistically significant.
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that discriminate against their employees use resources inefficiently. In 
other words, they sacrifi ce the profi ts that they would earn if they did not 
discriminate. Such fi rms would not survive in highly competitive industries. 
However, the fact that wage differentials exist implies inefficiencies in 
markets and production.
The issue of wage diff erentials among fi rms of diff erent sizes has a long 
history.1） In his seminal study, Moore (1911) investigated the wages of 
female employees aged 15 years in Italian textile factories. He found that 
there is a strong relationship between the number of employees and wage 
rates. His explanation is that this is because large fi rms have large amounts 
of capital and excellent infrastructure, so they can provide opportunities for 
their workers to use their talents.
Following Moore (1911), Mellow (1982) used the current population 
surveys to estimate a log-linear wage equation. The results show that even 
if the characteristics of workers and industries are controlled for, both the 
size of plants or establishments and the size of fi rms positively aff ect wages. 
Using both employee and firm data to test seven hypotheses relating to 
wage diff erentials, Troske (1999) found evidence of wage premiums in large 
fi rms. 
Wage diff erentials based on fi rm size broadly prevail. Miller (1981, 1985) 
fi nd that almost all manufacturing fi rms exhibit a relationship between fi rm 
size and wages. Brown et al. (1990) present evidence of a fi rm size–wage 
relationship among firms outside manufacturing. This research indicates 
that wage diff erentials based on fi rm size are common in all industries.
It is diffi  cult to determine what causes fi rm size and wages to be related. 
Some existing theoretical models provide plausible explanations. However, 
1） For a survey of empirical analyses, see Oi and Idson (1999).
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numerous recent empirical studies reveal that none of these theoretical 
explanations is consistent with the data.2） Thus, wage differentials between 
different-sized firms remain an unexplained aspect of wage determination.
In response to this, Michelacci and Quadrini (2005a, b, 2009) developed a 
new hypothesis. They argue that the difficulties firms encounter in 
borrowing funds for investment influence wages. For example, small 
businesses without adequate collateral assets cannot obtain sufficient funds 
through loans. In response, they try to generate funds for investment by 
keeping their workers’ wages low. Rapidly growing firms, on the other 
hand, can be expected to set current wages low and raise them in the 
future because they are likely to own adequate assets in the future. In 
other words, they “borrow” funds from their workers.
Michelacci and Quadrini (2005a) conducted an empirical analysis of this 
theory using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79). First, they ran a simulation of the theoretical model, generated 
data, and obtained parameter estimates from a regression model. They 
then generated estimates from the NLSY79 data and compared them with 
the model estimates. It transpired that the two sets of estimates were 
similar. Based on these findings, they claim that financial constraints can 
explain the wage differentials between different-sized firms.
However, their empirical analysis does not explicitly include an indicator 
of financial constraints. Therefore, it is not clear whether their findings 
validate the theoretical model or whether they constitute evidence of wage 
differentials that are caused by other factors. Conversely, they might have 
simply presented a model that duplicates the data, in which case, there is 
no guarantee that the phenomenon that they claim exists is actually there 
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to observe.
In this paper, to estimate the impact of financial constraints on wage 
differentials based on firm size, we use an indicator of the tightness of 
external financing. Our proposed indicator is the ratio of borrowings or 
debts to collateral assets. This is justified because financial constraints 
mean that borrowings cannot exceed the value of collateral. We use two 
indicators: the ratio of borrowings to total assets and the ratio of 
borrowings to tangible fixed assets. Our results suggest that these 
indicators weaken the relationship between firm size and wages. 
Furthermore, although the estimated effect of the ratio of borrowings to 
total assets is not statistically significant, the estimated coefficient of the 
ratio of borrowings to tangible fixed assets is negatively significant. This 
means that firms with sufficient tangible fixed assets, such as large firms, 
pay high wages. Hence, the hypothesis of Michelacci and Quadrini (2005a, 
b, 2009) is consistent with the data. Nevertheless, having accounted for 
these effects, there remains a statistically significant effect of firm size on 
wages; thus, financial constraints do not completely explain wage 
differentials.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review 
theoretical models of wage differentials including that of Michelacci and 
Quadrini (2005a, b). In Section 3, we compare estimates from Michelacci 
and Quadrini’s (2005a) model with those from models that include our 
proposed indicators of financial constraints. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Hypotheses of the Firm Size–Wage Premium
Can existing models explain wage differentials? Zabojnik and Bernhardt 
(2001) present a model in which employees in large firms are motivated to 
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invest in human capital because of greater competition for promotion. As a 
result, more employees have high levels of human capital; i.e., greater 
competition for promotion within firms raises wages.
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) argue that when informational asymmetry 
between employers and employees prevents employers from effectively 
monitoring their employees’ shirking, they pay an efficiency wage that 
gives employees an incentive not to shirk. However, this raises wages 
above the level that would prevail under symmetric information. In 
general, because it is more difficult for larger firms to monitor their 
employees, they pay higher wages.
According to MacDonald and Solow (1981), the higher is the bargaining 
power of the union relative to the firm, the higher are wages. Hence, given 
greater unionization in large firms, one would expect wage differentials 
based on firm size.
These explanations are plausible. However, Brown and Medoff (1989) 
suggest that even if all these effects are accounted for, firm size–wage 
effects remain. Therefore, existing theoretical models are not necessarily 
sufficient for explaining size-based wage differentials.
To deal with this problem, Michelacci and Quadrini (2005a, b, 2009) 
develop a new model in which firms require collateral to raise finance. 
Technically, they add a financial constraint à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
to the long-term contract models of Harris and Holmström (1982) and 
Holmström (1983). It is possible that borrowers cease production to 
renegotiate their financing contracts. Therefore, what borrowers can 
borrow is limited to the market value of their collateral. Because borrowers 
need collateral when raising finance, smaller firms, which do not have 
adequate collateral, implicitly borrow from their employees by paying 
lower wages because they are subject to financial constraints. Hence, 
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smaller fi rms pay lower wages.
To investigate their hypothesis, Michelacci and Quadrini (2005a, b, 2009) 
use the NLSY79. They fi nd that the estimates from the simulated data are 
similar to the estimates from the NLSY79. Hence, they conclude that their 
model is consistent with the data. To confirm this result directly, in the 
next section, we extend their empirical analysis.
3. The Empirical Models
3.1 Michelacci and Quadriniʼs Method
Michelacci and Quadrini (2005a) estimate the following model by using 
ordinary least squares:
  (1)
in which the variables are defi ned as follows:
: hourly wage;
: number of employees;
: average annual growth of the employer during the period 
of the worker’s service;
: period of service of the worker at time t;
: number of years of job experience (= age – years of 
education – 6);
: vector of the control variables;
: unobserved individual (fi xed) eff ects;
: error term.
The control variables are squared tenure, squared experience, a full set of 
year dummies, and a dummy variable that is unity if the fi rm had more than 
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one establishment when the worker was hired. Also included are 12 
industry dummies, four regional dummies, and a dummy variable for living 
in a metropolitan area, which is used to control for the possibly spurious 
correlation between fi rms’ growth rates and their sectoral and geographical 
characteristics. We focus on the coeffi  cient of fi rm size, . If the estimate 
of  is signifi cantly positive, there is a fi rm size–wage eff ect.
3.2 Michelacci and Quadriniʼs Model
A financial constraint arises because the amount of borrowings cannot 
exceed the value of collateral assets. Because large firms tend to own 
adequate collateral assets, their borrowings rarely amount to the value of 
their collateral assets. On the other hand, because small businesses lack 
adequate collateral assets, their borrowings depend on the amount of their 
collateral assets. To represent this, we define the (average) ratio of 
borrowings to total assets of a fi rm to which individual i belongs at time t as 
follows:
  
(2)
where  is the size of the fi rm to which individual  belongs at 
time . The numerator of the ratio of borrowings to total assets is the 
portion of capital expenditure that cannot be covered by cash fl ows; i.e., 
external borrowings. In other words, the ratio indicates the extent to 
which the fi rm (on average) borrows up to the limit imposed by the size of 
its assets. Given that total assets is the denominator of the ratio of 
borrowings to total assets, and because the level of assets that can be used 
as collateral increases with firm size, Eq. (2) implies that the larger the 
fi rm, the lower the ratio.
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However, total assets may include assets that are not of suffi  cient quality 
to be used as collateral. For example, intangible assets and assets deferred 
for tax purposes are not recognized as collateral, but are included in total 
assets in the balance sheet. Hence, based on an examination of mortgage 
loans in the U.S.,3） we also use tangible fixed assets (specifically, land, 
buildings, plant and machinery, and equipment) in the denominator to 
measure the debt-to-assets ratio:4）
  (3)
Based on Eq. (2) or Eq. (3), we estimate the following model:
  (4)
where  is  or . The control variables 
comprise the period of service and its square, the number of years of job 
experience and its square, year dummies, and a dummy variable that is 
unity for employers with two or more buildings. Additional control 
variables are dummy variables for 12 industry sectors, dummy variables for 
four geographical areas, and a dummy variable that is unity for workers 
residing in urban areas. Our main focus is on the fi rm-size coeffi  cient . If 
its estimated value is significantly positive, we can conclude that larger 
fi rms pay higher wages.
Because  is not a continuous function, we divide it into 13 levels. 
That is,  for the average debt-to-total-assets ratio of a firm with a 
workforce of 1–9 employees,  for the ratio of a firm with 10–19 
3） See Small Business Administration Offi  ce of Advocacy (1987, Chapter 2).
4） For small businesses, the personal assets of business owners should perhaps be included in 
the collateral, but we could not include them because of data limitations.
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employees, and so on for the following 11 employment levels: 20–49 
employees; 50–99 employees; 100–199 employees; 200–499 employees; 
500–999 employees; 1,000–1,999 employees; 2,000–4,999 employees; 
5,000–9,999 employees; 10,000–19,999 employees; 20,000–49,999 
employees; and 50,000 or more employees.
To construct the two debt-to-assets ratios, we use financial data covering 
9,110 American firms during the 1986–2002 period, taken from the 
Compustat North America database. In order to make the sample 
sufficiently reliable, we exclude negative observations and those that are 
more than two standard deviations above or below the average for each 
indicator.
Figure 1 shows the average debt-to-total-assets ratios for the 13 levels of 
firm size (in terms of numbers of employees). Although the smallest firm 
size (1–9 employees) has a lower ratio than does the next stage (10–19 
employees), the figure indicates that for the other levels, the debt-to-total-
assets ratio falls as size increases. Figure 2 shows the ratio of borrowings 
to tangible fixed assets. This ratio clearly declines as firm size rises.
For the other variables, we use NLSY79. While Michelacci and Quadrini 
(2005a) obtained their estimates by using NLSY79, they imposed various 
constraints to obtain a suitable sample. First, they sampled only the 
noninstitutionalized civilian segment of the youth population in the U.S., 
and limited their sample to the 1986–2002 period, for which data on the 
number of employees were available. They also adopted constraints to limit 
the sample to representative workers, namely, full-time workers, those 
working for employers with annual growth rates of between −10% and ＋
100%, and workers whose hourly wages ranged from $2 to $500. For 
details, see the Data Appendix of Michelacci and Quadrini (2005a).
Because the data constraints imposed by Michelacci and Quadrini (2005a) 
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Figure 1: Average debt-to-total-assets ratio
Figure 2: Ratio of borrowings to tangible fixed assets
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Note: The average debt-to-total-assets ratio for the 13 levels of firm size in terms of number of 
employees.
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Note: Ratio of borrowings to tangible fixed assets for the 13 levels of firm size in terms of number 
of employees.
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are strict, we attempt to confirm whether their estimation results are valid 
under more relaxed constraints. In particular, for the average growth rates 
of employers, we use a much wider range, from −100% to ＋100% 
(although, not surprisingly, the range of our data does not include −100%).
4. Estimation Results
The benchmark estimation results are shown in Table 1. In column (I), 
we use the same estimated equation reported by Michelacci and Quadrini 
(2005a). The null hypothesis that the coefficient of firm size is statistically 
insignificant is rejected at the 1% significance level. Hence, it is evident 
that firm size is correlated with wages. In column (II), we add the ratio of 
borrowings to total assets as an explanatory variable. Although its 
coefficient is not statistically significant, it is negative as expected. This 
indicates that wages tend to decline as financial constraints tighten. 
Comparing column (II) with column (I), the effect of firm size on wages is 
lower by 0.13 percentage points. This suggests that financial constraints 
have a slight effect. In column (III), we add the ratio of borrowings to 
tangible fixed assets as an explanatory variable. Its coefficient is 
significantly negative, indicating that the severity of financial constraints 
clearly lowers wages. This time, including financial constraints greatly 
reduces the effect of firm size: comparing column (III) with column (I), the 
coefficient of firm size is 0.58 percentage points lower.
In Table 2, we report the estimation results obtained by including 
additional variables. Column (V) includes the ratio of borrowings to total 
assets. Its coefficient is larger in absolute magnitude than that in column 
(II), in which there are fewer control variables. Comparing column (V) with 
column (IV), the effect of firm size on wages is 0.18 percentage points 
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lower. However, caution must be exercised because the coeffi  cient of the 
ratio of borrowings to total assets in (V) is not statistically signifi cant. In 
column (VI), the coefficient of the ratio of borrowings to tangible fixed 
assets is signifi cantly negative, as in column (III), but the coeffi  cient of fi rm 
size is lower by 0.66 percentage points. Therefore, we estimate that up to 
43% of the effect of firm size on wages is accounted for by financial 
constraints. We also estimate the model by including as explanatory 
variables interaction terms between the fi nancial constraint variables and 
the industry dummy variables. However, this hardly aff ects the estimation 
results.
Table 1: Benchmark estimates
Variable (I) (II) (III)
0.0160 *** 0.0147 *** 0.0102 ***
(0.0018) (0.0040) (0.0030)
–0.0556 * –0.0556 * –0.0551 *
(0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287)
0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037)
0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
–0.0209
(0.0488)
–0.0020 **
(0.0009)
Number of obs. 32,629 32,629 32,629
R-squared 0.1843 0.1844 0.1838
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of wages per hour. The models are 
estimated by using the fi xed-eff ects estimator. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** denotes statistical signifi cance at the 1% level, ** denotes statistical signifi cance 
at 5 % , and * denotes statistical signifi cance at 10 % . The estimated coeffi  cients of the control 
variables are omitted.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper, we used the NLSY79 to investigate the hypothesis that the 
tightness of fi nancial constraints explains the hypothesized fi rm size–wage 
eff ect. In earlier work, Michelacci and Quadrini (2005a) compare simulation 
results with estimates from the NLSY79 and argue that their model well 
captures the behavior of actual data: that is, fi nancial constraints matter. In 
this paper, we included two indicators of the tightness of financial 
constraints to confi rm their hypothesis.
Our estimation results support the theoretical predictions of Michelacci 
and Quadrini (2005a, b, 2009): that is, the theory that a firm with few 
collateral assets faces financial constraints and must keep wages low to 
Table 2: Estimates with additional control variables
Variable (I) (II) (III)
0.0154 *** 0.0136 *** 0.0088 ***
(0.0018) (0.0039) (0.0030)
–0.0417 * –0.0416 * –0.0413 *
(0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0288)
0.0022 0.0022 0.0021
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
0.0022 0.0022 0.0021
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
–0.0279
(0.0483)
–0.0023 **
(0.0009)
Number of obs. 32,215 32,215 32,215
R-squared 0.2049 0.2049 0.2042
Note: All estimated equations include the additional control variables.
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achieve a sufficient level of investment is consistent with real-world data. 
However, even when we include financial constraints, firm size continues to 
exert a statistically significant effect on wages. Consequently, financial 
constraints cannot completely explain firm size-based wage differentials.
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Data Appendix
Data on the ratio of debt to total assets and the ratio of debt to tangible 
fixed assets were taken from the Compustat North America database. We 
used data on 9,110 firms in the U.S. from 1986 to 2002. We used “capital 
expenditure” for capital expenditure. For cash flow, we used “Operating 
Activities - Net Cash Flow” plus “Inventory - Decrease (Increase)” plus 
“Receivables - Decrease (Increase)” plus “Accounts Payable & Accrued 
Liabs - Inc (Dec)”. For total assets, we used “Assets - Total”. For tangible 
fixed assets, we used “Property Plant and Equipment - Total (Net)”. For 
the number of employees, we used “Employees”. To exclude outliers, we 
chose firms with between one and 100,000 employees, and excluded firms 
with negative observations and with observations beyond two standard 
deviations of the mean.
Data on other variables were taken from the NLSY79. See Michelacci 
and Quadrini (2005a) and the NLSY79 User’s Guide. However, we 
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restricted our sample to firms with hourly wages of between $2 and $500 
and with average growth rates of between −100% and ＋100%.
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